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Aggey Semenov† and Jean-Baptiste Tondji
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Abstract
We consider a setting where firms in the first stage invest in cost-reducing R&D. In
the market stage, one firm sets a quantity, and another sets a price. We prove that the
quantity-setting firm invests more in R&D, has a lower price, and produces higher quan-
tity than the price-setting firm. We also consider welfare implications.
JEL: D43, L13, O32
Keywords: Cournot-Bertrand model, Product differentiation, R&D, Welfare.
1 Introduction
Static models of product differentiation mostly focus on quantity (Cournot) and price (Bertrand)
types of competition. However, there are sectors where firms engage in mixed (Cournot-
Bertrand) competition; some firms offer quantity contracts to customers, and other firms offer
price contracts. Tremblay et al. (2013) and Tremblay & Tremblay (2011) give an example of
the market for small cars, where Honda and Subaru set the quantities and Saturn and Scion
set prices. Flath (2012) shows that for 30 out of 70 Japanese industries companies use some
form of mixed competition. In the Japanese home electronics industry, Panasonic (formerly
known as Matsushita) uses quantity competition while Sanyo employs pricing strategies (Sato
(1996)). Klemperer & Meyer (1986) argue that in international consulting firms the manage-
ment consulting division operates in a quantity-setting fashion, whereas the auditing division
sets a strictly defined fee per hour.
Vives (2001) and Singh & Vives (1984) study the choice of contracts in a differentiated
duopoly with linear demands. They show that with symmetric costs, firms prefer Cournot game
to the Bertrand and mixed settings when products are substitutes. Several studies have also
shown that firms often compete against each other by investing in R&D to reduce production
cost (see, for instance, Qiu (1997) and the references therein). Such a dynamic framework
changes the post-innovation demand and cost structures of the firms and might affect the
market competition.
∗Corresponding author : Jean-Baptiste Tondji, address: The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, College
of Business and Entrepreneurship, Department of Economics and Finance, 1201 West University Dr., ECOBE
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2 THE MODEL
In this paper, we consider a duopoly model, where in the first stage firms invest in cost-
reducing R&D. In the second stage, firms engage in mixed competition. We provide new findings
that the quantity-setting firm may undertake more investments than the Cournot firm, and sets
a price which is lower than the price-setting firm’s price. We show that mixed competition yields
greater consumer surplus and social welfare than Cournot competition, and for close substitutes,
there is over-production for the quantity setting firm.
2 The model
Consider a sector of an economy with two firms i = 1, 2 producing differentiated goods q1
and q2 respectively. A representative consumer’s utility function is: U(q1, q2) = α(q1 + q2) −
(q21 + 2βq1q2 + q
2
2)/2, α > 0, β ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter β measures the degree of product
differentiation, with differentiation increasing as β is close to zero. The inverse market demands
are linear: pi = α− qi − βqj, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
Firms may invest in cost-reducing R&D. The pre-innovation costs for the two firms are
ci = c < α. If firm i engages in R&D, then by spending V (xi) on R&D, it lowers its marginal
cost by xi: ci = c− xi. We assume that V (xi) = v x
2
i
2
, where v relates to the productivity of the
R&D technology (higher v means lower productivity).
Timing is the following. In the first stage, firms 1 and 2 simultaneously invest the amounts
xi, i = 1, 2 respectively in R&D. Firms observe the amount invested by their rivals. In the
second stage, firms compete in the market. Firm 1 chooses an output q1, while firm 2 chooses
a price p2.
We consider the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the second stage, firms market profits
are pi1(q1, p2;x1) = p1 (q1, p2) q1− (c−x1)q1 and pi2(q1, p2;x2) = p2q2 (q1, p2)− (c−x2)q2 (q1, p2).
The equilibrium in the market subgame is
q1(x1, x2) =
(2− β)(α− c) + 2x1 − βx2
4− 3β2 and (1)
p2(x1, x2) =
α (1− β) (2 + β2) + c(2 + β − 2β2)− βx1 − 2(1− β2)x2
4− 3β2 . (2)
The equilibrium of the game (x∗1, x
∗
2, q
∗
1, p
∗
2) is described by best responses of each firm i
given the outcome of the induced market game
x∗i ∈ arg max
xi
Πi(xi, x
∗
j) = pii(q1(xi, x
∗
j), p2(xi, x
∗
j);xi)−
1
2
vx2i ,
and q∗1 = q1 (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) , p
∗
2 = p2 (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) . Denote by v =
4(1+β)
(2+β)(4−3β2) and v =
2(2−β2)
(2−β)(4−3β2) . Note
that v > v . The equilibrium R&D levels are
x1 =
χ
∆
v − v
v
, and x2 =
χ
∆
v − v
v
, (3)
where ∆ ≡ 8(1− β2)(2− β2)− 2(4− 3β2)(8− 8β2 + β4)v + (4− 3β2)3v2 and χ = 8(α− c)(1−
β2)(2− β2).
Assumption 1: v > 3α
c
.
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2 THE MODEL
This assumption guarantees positive investments in R&D for both firms and positive post-
innovation costs. Also, Assumption 1 is needed for the second-order and stability conditions.
If R&D investments are very productive, the firms will invest more to gain a competitive
advantage in the market game which will lead to zero and even negative post-innovation costs.
Throughout the remaining of the paper, we assume that Assumption 1 holds.1
Using (1) - (3), we obtain the equilibrium prices and quantities
q1 = q
0
1 +
χ
(4− 3β2) ∆
(
2
v − v
v
− β v − v
v
)
, (4)
p1 = p
0
1 −
χ
(4− 3β2) ∆
((
2− β2) v − v
v
+
(
1− β2) β v − v
v
)
, (5)
q2 = q
0
2 +
χ
(4− 3β2) ∆
((
2− β2) v − v
v
− β v − v
v
)
, and (6)
p2 = p
0
2 −
χ
(4− 3β2) ∆
(
β
v − v
v
+ 2(1− β2)v − v
v
)
, (7)
where p0i and q
0
i are equilibrium prices and quantities in the game without R&D. The equilibrium
profits are
Π1 =
χ2v
2∆2
(
(4− 3β2)2v
8(1− β2) − 1
)(
v − v
v
)2
and Π2 =
χ2v
4∆2
(
(4− 3β2)2v
(2− β2)2 − 2
)(
v − v
v
)2
. (8)
Comparisons based on (3) - (8) yield the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For any β ∈ (0, 1)
a) x1 > x2 > 0,
b) q1 > q2 and p1 < p2,
c) Π1 > Π2 > 0.
Both firms use R&D to minimize costs when products are differentiated. Firm 1 invests more
in R&D than firm 2. Consider the incentives of firms to invest in R&D. Using the first-order
conditions and the Envelope Theorem we have
∂Π1
∂x1
=
∂pi1
∂p2
∂p2
∂x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic effect
+ q1︸︷︷︸
size effect
−V ′(x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost effect
, and
∂Π2
∂x2
=
∂pi2
∂q1
∂q1
∂x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic effect
+ q2︸︷︷︸
size effect
−V ′(x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost effect
.
The strategic effect reflects the fact that a firm’s R&D reduces its production cost, and
consequently affects the competitor’s strategic choice. Investing x1 in R&D has a negative
effect on p2,
∂p2
∂x1
< 0. Because goods are substitutes, the effect of p2 on firm 1’s profit is
positive: ∂pi1
∂p2
= q1
∂p1
∂p2
> 0. It follows that the strategic effect is negative for firm 1. For firm
2, an increase in x2 induces firm 1 to decrease q1,
∂q1
∂x2
< 0. The effect of q1 on firm 2’s profit is
negative, ∂pi2
∂q1
= (p2− (c− x2)) ∂q2∂q1 < 0. Thus, the strategic effect is positive for firm 2. Next,
1Note that Qiu (1997) uses a weaker assumption for Cournot competition, v > αc , and a stronger assumption
(9) for Bertrand competition.
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a firm’s R&D reduces its unit cost of production. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the larger is the
production, the higher is the size effect. Finally, investing in R&D is costly, i.e., the cost effect
is negative for both firms.
Proposition 1 states that firm 1’s size effect is stronger than the firm’s 2 size effect. Moreover,
the size effect dominates the negative strategic effect. To see the intuition, we note that the
residual demands for firms 1 and 2 are q1 =
1
1−β2 (α (1− β)− p1 + βp2) and q2 = α− p2 − βq1
respectively. Firms choose price or quantity from the residual demands, which are defined by
the competitor’s strategy choice. Note that the residual demand for firm 1 is more elastic
than for firm 2. In the first case, the absolute value of the slope is 1
1−β2 , and in the second
case, it is 1. Note also that investments in innovations have the opposite effect on residual
demands. Investment x1 lowers costs for firm 1 and thus lowers p2. This shifts the residual
demand for firm 1 downwards. Investment x2 has a decreasing effect on q1 and, therefore,
increases the residual demand for firm 2. Prices and quantities are defined by intersections
of corresponding post-innovation costs c − xi with marginal residual revenues. Consider an
increase in x1. Even though the strategic considerations shift the residual demand downwards,
because it is sufficiently elastic, this increase in x1 has a large positive effect on q1. Thus, the
size effect is strong. Similarly, because the residual demand for firm 2 is relatively inelastic, an
increase in x2 has a smaller size effect.
Without innovations, we have p01 > p
0
2.
2 With innovations, the price p1 is lower than p2
because of two factors. First, firm 1 invests more in cost reduction than firm 2. Second, the
residual demand curve is more elastic for firm 1 than for firm 2. Thus, firm 1 has greater
incentives to lower the price. Finally, firm 1 is more efficient than firm 2 which leads to the
ranking of profits.
In Propositions 2 and 3, we compare mixed competition with Bertrand and Cournot. In
these comparisons, we assume that condition (9) below is satisfied to guarantee the regularity
conditions for respective equilibria (see also Qiu (1997)).3
v >
2 (2− β2)2
(1− β2) (4− β2)2 . (9)
Denoting by C and B the outcomes in Bertrand and Cournot games with R&D, the optimal
R&D investments, prices, and quantities are
xB =
2(2− β2)(α− c)
∆B
, xC =
4(α− c)
∆C
, pB =
(2− β)(1 + β)(2 + β)(α(1− β) + c)v − 2α(2− β2)
∆B
,
(10)
pC =
(4− β2)(α + c+ βc)v − 4α
∆C
, qB =
(4− β2)(α− c)v
∆B
, and qC =
(4− β2)(α− c)v
∆C
, (11)
where ∆C = v(2 + β)
2(2 − β) − 4, and ∆B = (2 − β)2(1 + β)(2 + β)v − 2(2 − β2). From (10)
and (11), we immediately obtain xC > xB, qC < qB, and pC > pB.
2See also Tremblay & Tremblay (2011).
3Note that condition (9) is involved only when we consider comparisons with Bertrand model.
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Proposition 2. For any β ∈ (0, 1)
a) x2 < xB < xC,
b) there exist 0 < β2 < β1 < 1 such that x1 > xC for β ∈ (0, β2) , xB ≤ x1 ≤ xC for
β ∈ [β2, β1] and x1 < xB for β ∈ (β1, 1),
c) pB < p1 < p2 < pC, and q2 < qC < qB < q1.
In Bertrand and Cournot models, the strategic effect is negative and positive respectively.
The residual demands for Cournot competition are more inelastic than for Bertrand competi-
tion. Thus, the size effect is stronger for Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition.
However, the size effect is not enough to overcome the differences in strategic effects (see Qiu
(1997)). Thus, we have xC > xB. The relative importance of the positive strategic effect
compared to the size effect for firm 2 leads to x2 < xB. The ranking of investment by firm
1 depends on the level of substitutability of goods. When β increases, the negative strategic
effect becomes stronger (it may be even stronger than for Bertrand competition). This drives
x1 down compared to xC , and for large β, x1 is below xB. However, these differences in levels
of innovations are not enough to change the ranking of prices and quantities.
It is clear that the consumer surplus under Bertrand competition is greater than under
Cournot competition. Comparisons with the mixed competition are more intricate. Prices for
the mixed competition are between prices for Cournot and Bertrand. However, the gap between
quantities q2 and q1 is quite large. We consider welfare implications in the next section.
3 Consumer Surplus, Profits, and Welfare
The Bertrand and Cournot consumer surpluses and profits with R&D are
CSB =
(α− c)2v2
∆2B
(1 + β)(4− β2)2, ΠB = (α− c)
2v
∆2B
(
(4− β2)2(1− β2)v − 2(2− β2)2) ,
CSC =
(α− c)2v2
∆2C
(1 + β)(4− β2)2, ΠC = (α− c)
2v
∆2C
(
(4− β2)2v − 8) ,
respectively. We have
Proposition 3. For any β ∈ (0, 1)
a) CSC < CS < CSB,
b) Π2 < ΠB < ΠC, and there exists a unique v1 = v1(β) such that
Π1 − ΠC =
{
≥ 0 if v ≤ v1
< 0 if v > v1
,
c) WC < W < WB.
Vives (2001) and Singh & Vives (1984) show that without R&D, consumer surplus is the
largest for Bertrand competition. Qiu (1997) finds the same result with cost-reducing R&D. We
confirm the robustness of this result. Prices are still lower in the case of Bertrand competition.
High quantity and low price for firm 1 are not enough to overcome the inefficiency generated by
5
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firm 2. Singh & Vives (1984) establish that without R&D, Cournot competition leads to higher
profits than Bertrand and mixed competition when products are substitutes. We show that
this is not always the case when firms may invest in R&D. In the case of sufficiently productive
innovations, firm 1’s profit dominates the Cournot’s profit. In this case, firm 1 invests more
in cost-reducing innovation. Finally, Qiu (1997) shows that WB > WC ; Bertrand competition
is always more efficient than Cournot. We find that mixed competition leads to intermediate
welfare.
Social Planner
The social planner’s problem is
max
x1,x2,q1,q2
WS = U(q1, q2)−
2∑
i=1
(c− xi)qi − 1
2
v
2∑
i=1
x2i .
Assumption 2: v > 1
1−β .
Assumption 2 ensures that the second-order condition for the social planner’s problem is
satisfied. Assumption 1 guarantees hat optimal post-innovation costs are positive. The social
planner’s optimal decision is symmetric and given by
xi = xS =
α− c
(1 + β)v − 1 , qi = qS =
(α− c)v
(1 + β)v − 1 . (12)
Proposition 4. Assume Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then,
a) for any given β ∈ (0, 1) xS > x1 > x2,
b) for any given β ∈ (0, 1), qS > q2,
c) if β ∈
(
0,
√
17−1
4
)
, then qS > q1,
d) there exist β3 ∈
(√
17−1
4
, 1
)
and a unique v2(β) such that qS < q1 whenever β ∈ [β3, 1) or
[β < β3 and v > v2(β)].
In the social planner’s model, the strategic effect vanishes. Even though firm 1 invests
more than firm 2, it never overinvests. Interestingly, for close substitute products, firm 1 may
produce more than the social optimum.4 In this case, the negative strategic effect is strong and
to overcome it, in equilibrium, firm 1 produces more than the socially optimal quantity.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Roland Pongou, Elena Quercioli and especially Gamal Atallah for their
insightful comments and useful discussions. We also acknowledge the editor and anonymous
referee for their thoughtful suggestions.
4Qiu (1997) finds that qS is always greater than qB .
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Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. a) x1x2 =
v−v
v−v
v
v > 1, since v > v, and v > v. b) q1 − q2 = q01 − q02 +
χ
(4−3β2)∆
{
(2 + β)(v−vv − v−vv ) + β2 v−vv
}
and p1−p2 = p01−p02− χ(4−3β2)∆
{
(1− β) (2 + β2) v−vv + (2 + β)(1− β2) v−vv }.
Given that q01 − q02 > 0, and p01 − p02 < 0, it follows that q1 > q2, and p1 < p2. c) Since v−vv > v−vv ,
Π1 −Π2 > χ
2(4−3β2)v2
32∆2CB(1−β2)(2−β2)2
( v−vv )
2g(β), with g(β) = 2(2− β2)2 − 8(1− β2) ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. a) x2 − xB = 2β
4v(2−β2)(α−c)
∆∆B
A(v;β), with A(v;β) = a1 + a2v, where a1 =
−2(2 − β − 2β2), and a2 = −β2(4 − 3β2) < 0. Let a = −a1a2 , a is an increasing function with a(1) = 2,
and a ≥ 0 if β ≥ (√17 − 1)/4. For any β, A(v;β) < 0 if v > a. For any v we have v > a. Therefore,
A(v;β) < 0, and x2 < xB , because sign (x2 − xB) = sign (A(v;β)). Following that approach, we prove that
x2 < xC . It is immediate that xB < xC . b) x1 − xB = 2β
3v(2−β2)(α−c)
∆∆B
B(v;β), where B(v;β) = b1 + b2v, with
b1 = −16 + 8β + 24β2 − 8β3 − 8β4 + 2β5, and b2 = 32− 16β − 64β2 + 24β3 + 38β4 − 9β5 − 6β6. We have sign
(x1 − xB) = sign (B(v;β)). Then, given any v, there exists an unique β1—the root of order 4 of a polynomial
of degree 6—, such that B(v;β) ≥ 0 if 0 < β ≤ β1 and B(v : β) < 0 if β1 < β < 1. Similarly, we compare x1
and xC , and items in c).
Proof of Proposition 3. a) CS−CSC = (α−c)
2v2
2∆2∆2C
C(v;β), where G(v;β) = −2(1+β)(4−β2)2(8(2−3β2 +
β4)+2(−4+3β2)(8−8β2+β4)v−(−4+3β2)3v2)2+(4−3β2)2(4(8+β(8+β(2+β)(−6+β(−3+4β))))∆2C+4(−4+
3β2)∆2. Using Mathematica (Wolfram Research Inc. (2019)), we can write C(v;β) = c0+c1v+c2v
2+c3v
3+c4v
4,
where each ci is a function of β. For any β, there are two real solutions to C = 0, which are c(β) and c(β),
with c > c. The latter is a decreasing function whereas the former is an increasing function with c(1) = 4/3.
Moreover for any v > c, C(v;β) > 0. Since v > c, then, for any β ∈ (0, 1), CS > CSC . Using the same
approach, we prove that CS < CSB , and it is immediate that CSB > CSC .
b) It is also immediate that under (9), ΠB − ΠC < 0. Now, we write Π2 − ΠC = (α−c)
2v
∆2∆2C
D(v;β), where
D(v;β) = (1− β)2[−2(2− β2)2 + (4− 3β2)2v][4(1 + β)− (2 + β)(4− 3β2)v]2∆2C + (8− (4− β2)v)∆, and sign
(Π2−ΠC)= sign (D(v;β)). Simplification and term collection yield D(v;β) = v(d1 +d2v+d3v2 +d4v3 +d5v4),
where each di is a function of β. Given any β, there exist four real solutions to D = 0, which we denote
by di(β), i = 1, 2, 3, 4. It can be shown that d1 is a decreasing function with d1(0) = 0.5, d2, d3, and d4 are
increasing functions with d2(1) = 8/9, and d3(1) = d4(1) = 2. Therefore, for any β ∈ (0, 1), D(v;β) < 0 if
0 < v < d1 or d2 < v < d3 or v > d4, and D(v;β) > 0 if d1 < v < d2 or d3 < v < d4. We have v > d4(β)
for any β ∈ (0, 1), and the result follows. We use the same reasoning to compare Π1 and ΠC , and prove that
Π2 −ΠB < 0.
c) W −WB = (α−c)
2v
2∆2∆2B
E(v;β), where E(v;β) = e0 + e1v + e2v
2 + e3v
3 + e4v
4 + e5v
5, with each ei as a
function of β. Under (9), there are two real solutions to E = 0, which we denote e(β), and e(β), with e > e.
The inequality v < e contradicts Assumption 1. Moreover, there exists a positive number s < β, such that
E(v;β) < 0 for any v > e and β < s. Also, if β ≥ s, and v > e, we can’t have E(v;β) ≥ 0. However, if β ≥ s,
then E(v;β) < 0 if v > 3 and β < 1. Since v > 3, we conclude that E(v;β) < 0, and W < WB . Using the
same reasoning, we prove that W > WC .
Proof of Proposition 4. Part a) is straightforward.
b) We write, q2−qS = v(α−c)∆∆S F (v;β), where ∆S = (1+β)v−1, F (v;β) = f0+f1v+f2v2, with f0 = −4β2(1−
β2) < 0, f1 = 16−20β2 +4β3 +2β4−3β5 +3β6 > 0, f2 = −32+16β+64β2−40β3−42β4 +33β5 +9β6−9β7 < 0,
and sign (q2 − qS) = sign (F (v;β). Since the second derivative is Fvv = 2f2 < 0, F is strictly concave in v.
Note that f21 − 4f0f2 > 0 for all β ∈ (0, 1). Thus, given any β, there are two solutions to F = 0, which are,
7
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f(β) =
−f1−
√
f21−4f2f0
2f2
, and f(β) =
−f1+
√
f21−4f2d0
2f2
, with f < f . Therefore, F (v;β) ≥ 0 if f ≤ v ≤ f , and
F (v;β) < 0 if 0 < v < f or v > f . It can be shown that f is an increasing function with f(1) = 2. Under
Assumption 1, v > f for any given β. Therefore, for any β, F (v;β) < 0, and q2 < qS .
c) q1 − qS = v(α−c)∆S∆ G(v;β), where G(v;β) = g0 + g1v+ g2v2, with g0 = 2β2(2− β2) > 0, g1 = (4− 3β2)[4 +
β2(−8 + β(−1 + 2β))], g2 = (4 − 3β2)2(−2 + β + 2β2), and sign (q1 − qS) = sign (G(v;β). Note that for
any given β, there are two real solutions to G = 0, which we denote g(β) and g(β), with g(β) < 0 for any β.
Moreover, g2(β) ≥ 0 if β ∈ (0,
√
17−1
4 ], and g2(β) < 0 if β ∈ (
√
17−1
4 , 1). Assume that β ∈ (0,
√
17−1
4 ]. Then, the
second derivative Gvv = 2g2 ≥ 0, and G is concave in v. Hence, for any given v, G(v;β) ≥ 0 if 0 < v ≤ g, and
G(v;β) < 0 if v > g. Under Assumption 1, G is always negative, and this happens only if v > g. Given α > c,
then v > 3. Hence, if v ≤ 2.5(5 +√17), we have G < 0. Otherwise, v > 2.5(5 +√17), then we need β <
√
17−1
4
to have G < 0, which is satisfied. It follows that for any β ≤
√
17−1
4 , G(v;β) < 0, and q1 ≤ qS .
d) Assume that β ∈ (
√
17−1
4 , 1). Then, the second derivative Gvv = 2g2 > 0, and G is strictly convex in
v. Hence, for any given v which satisfies Assumption 2, G(v;β) ≥ 0 if v ≥ g, and G(v;β) < 0 if g < v < g.
Consider β3 the root of degree 3 of the polynomial −16 + 40x2 + 8x3 − 28x4 − 16x5 + 7x6 + 6x7. Given any
β ≥ β3, and any v that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, then v > g. Therefore, G(v;β) > 0, and q1 − qS > 0. If
β < β3, then G(v;β) > 0 whenever v > g. Take v2 = g, and q1 > qS .
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